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Speech by Mr. Chris Patten, European Commissioner for
External Relations
to the European Parliament’s Plenary debate on the Greater
Middle East Region
May I first thank the Parliament for making time in what I
know is a packed agenda for a discussion of the
Mediterranean and the Middle East. The directions we set for
our policies in this region in the coming months should be
thoroughly discussed and debated here because they involve
fundamental decisions on how we are going to develop our
relationship with our neighbours.
My colleague from the Presidency has explained very clearly
the principles in the interim report adopted by EU foreign
ministers last week and how, through a series of intensive
consultations with the region, they will form the basis of a
concrete work programme to be presented to the European
Council in June.
I would, however, like to underline that we are not starting
from scratch: rather we are building on a comprehensive
partnership with the Mediterranean countries and a set of
bilateral relations with the countries east of Jordan. We
will continue to develop our partnership on the basis of
these existing instruments. I would add here that Europe is
the most significant player. The Community now spends close
to €1 billion a year in the region in promoting economic
reforms, sectoral reform, institutional and political reform
and supporting sustainable development across the region
including our specific funds for supporting the Palestinians
and for the reconstruction of Iraq. Add the lending from the
European Investment Bank to make a total of around €2.5
billion a year. Furthermore, the EU is the biggest trading
partner for every country of the region except Jordan.
So with this level of involvement, why has economic
development and political reform been so slow to take off
around the Mediterranean? Why is the human development gap
still so great? I think the answer is two-fold. First of
all, our approach is a long term one which bears fruit
incrementally, but I would venture that working on the basis
of partnership, consultation and ownership of the reform
process by reformers in the region will give us more solid
and sustainable results than any attempts to impose
democracy from the outside, whether through persuasion or
through the barrel of a gun.
But secondly, and crucially, it is important to remember
that the Barcelona Process was formulated in an atmosphere
of optimism, in the aftermath of the Oslo agreements.
Stalemate in the peace process has time and again stymied
progress on reform. And recent events are another sad but
powerful confirmation that, as our report put it: “it will
not be possible to build a common zone of peace, prosperity
and progress unless a just and lasting settlement of the
conflict is in place.”
Yet again we stand before the smoking ruins of the Peace
Process. And this at a time when we had some hope of
movement: yesterday’s cancelled Arab League Summit was
expected to provide a positive impetus to the peace process
by re-launching its Beirut peace initiative.
How, I wonder, has Yassin’s assassination helped to improve
the security of the Israeli people? How has it contributed
to even the stated goal of a peaceful and consensual
withdrawal from Gaza? I thought, and I still hope, that we
had already seen the worst of the atrocities carried out by
suicide bombers. But what we are witnessing lately is
wickedness beyond imagination: a frightened adolescent
packed with explosives, told that he will go to heaven and
sent to kill himself and others at a military checkpoint. It
is despicable and cowardly.
My broader point is that if we are serious about wanting
reform in the Arab World then, as the European Security
Strategy states, resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict
remains a strategic priority. Progress cannot be a
pre-condition for confronting the challenges of reform, nor
vice-versa. But to attempt one without the other is, in my
view, a recipe for failure on both counts.
I regret, then, that the Arab League summit could not take
place as planned, not least because it was expected to adopt
a common declaration on domestic reform which would have
been an important staging post in developing our common
agenda. But working in this part of the world means, almost
by definition, to remain hopeful. I hope that our Arab
partners will be able to come together again soon and I am
certainly prepared to do what I can to help. And I believe
that we now have an EU position which we can take into
consultations with the region with some confidence of
generating new momentum in our relations with our
Mediterranean and Middle Eastern neighbours.
I also hope that our friends across the Atlantic are
recognising that our long-term, consensus-building approach
has some value, based as it is, on building common agendas
that respect differences of approach in different countries
and regions. The Greater Middle East initiative from the US
generated controversy in the region, mainly because the
objectives appeared to have been set without any real
consultation process with the region. In the furore
surrounding this, few paid attention to the substance. In
content, what they are suggesting could involve the
development of US policy towards the region based on the
kind of comprehensive and long term engagement which we have
been advocating and implementing for many years. We will
have much to talk about with them if they are prepared to
match this commitment with appropriate levels of resources.
Time will tell, but whatever the results, the EU should
focus on developing its own strategic partnership with the
region. If we are successful, I believe we can make a
significant contribution to fighting terrorism in Europe and
in the region, one that is as important as the proposals to
strengthen the EU’s internal security that you will discuss
tomorrow. It will take us another step down the road towards
a central objective of the EU’s Security Strategy, namely:
“to promote a ring of well-governed countries … on the
borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close
and co-operative relations.”
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